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There are two aims to this paper: firstly, to provide an objective technical assessment of the 
current situation of the contributory pension system in Spain and its prospects for the future, 
and secondly, to look at the issues surrounding the introduction of a system of notional 
defined contribution accounts. To this end we explain the basic elements upon which the 
current system is based and show its main indicators, then set out some of its fundamental 
problems. Following this we look at the most relevant research work, where forecasts can be 
found that will give us a clear idea of the system's financial sustainability. Finally we put 
forward an argument as to why a notional accounts system could be a valid alternative for 
reforming the current system, and suggest which formula or group of formulas would best fit 
the profile of contributor-beneficiary risk and what the transition process would be. 
(JEL: H55, J26) 
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I.-INTRODUCTION 
The race to reform pension systems in many countries over the last few years has been such 
that, as Valdés (2002) points out, the problems of pension reform have begun to dominate 
economic policy.  
The main reforms proposed and applied can be summarized as parametric reforms of the pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) system, changes to other (mainly capitalization) systems, and systems 
combining funded system and PAYG, as proposed chiefly by the World Bank. Reform trends 
championed by the main international organizations can be found in papers by Gillion (2000), 
Holzmann (2000) and Queisser (2000). 
One of the most important recent innovations in pension reform has been the introduction of 
so-called “notional defined contribution accounts” in some countries, namely Brazil
3 (1999), 
Italy (1995), Latvia (1996), Mongolia (2000), The Kyrgyz Republic (1997)
4, Poland (1999) 
and Sweden (1999). According to Williamson (2004), other countries such as China and Russia 
are also seriously thinking about introducing them. 
The European Union, the World Bank and the OECD, along with various Spanish researchers 
such as Alonso & Herce (2003), Barea & Gónzalez-Páramo (1996), Bonin et al. (2001), 
Devesa et al. (2000 & 2002), Durán & López-García (1996), Gil & Patxot (2002), Herce 
(1997 & 2001), Herce & Pérez (1995), Herce & Alonso (2000a & 2000b), Jimeno (2003, 
2002 &  2000) Jimeno & Licandro (1999), Mateo (1997), Meneu (1998), Montero (2000), and 
Piñera & Weinstein (1996), have all strongly recommended an in-depth revision of the 
Spanish public pension system. All are agreed that, at least in the long term, the financial 
viability of the system is seriously at risk. One valid possibility could be the introduction of 
notional accounts, as first suggested by Mateo (1997) and taken up in more detail by Devesa 
& Vidal (2004) and Vidal et al. (2004) and (2005). 
In this paper we will provide an objective technical assessment of the current situation of the 
contributory pension system in Spain and its prospects for the future. We will then look into 
the possibility of introducing a system of notional defined contribution accounts. To this end, 
the structure of the paper is as follows: after this introduction, in Section II we explain the 
basic elements upon which the current system is based and show its main indicators; in 
Section III we set out its fundamental problems and look at the most relevant research work, 
the conclusions of which will give us a clear idea of the system's financial sustainability; 
Section IV includes a number of reasons as to why a notional accounts system could be a 
valid alternative for reforming the current system; in Section V we discuss which formula or 
group of formulas would best fit the profile of contributor-beneficiary risk and what the 
transition process would be; and finally we present our conclusions.  
II.-THE PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM IN SPAIN 
In this section we show the main features of the Spanish Social Security system and supply 
some key data. The system provides the following types of protection: 
a) Contributory social insurance programs, organized along occupational lines, which awards 
benefits to compensate for revenue no longer earned due to sickness, accident, 
                                                 
3 This is not exactly a notional accounts system. 
4 The Kyrgyz Republic’s scheme, Palmer (2005), is incompletely designed regarding the rate of return, although 
the long transition period will allow plenty of time to improve the system design.   4
unemployment, family responsibilities, disability, old age and death. The amount payable 
depends on how much has been contributed over how long. This type of protection is financed 
by contributions from employees and/or employers, and is run by the state. 
b) Non-contributory protection, the purpose of which is to provide financial cover for 
disability, old age, unemployment and family responsibilities. The amount payable is the 
same for everyone and conditional upon the beneficiary's lack of resources. This type of 
protection is financed and run by the state through taxation.  
c) A universal benefit, basically healthcare and social services, open to everyone and financed 
at present through a mixed system of social security contributions and money from the state. 
There are plans to finance it in future through general revenues alone. 
d) Alongside the previous types of state-run protection there also exists a complementary 
system of privately-run protection. Its most visible forms are friendly societies, group life 
insurance, and pension plans and funds. 
This paper will concentrate mainly on type a). The contributory system is structured in 
different "regimes" or systems, each of which covers a group of workers of a particular type. 
These special systems, as will be seen later on, cause a great many problems. At present the 
following systems exist: 
a) General System. This is the essential nucleus of the system as a whole and includes all 
employees over 16 not included in another "special system". It accounts for 60% of pensions 
and 75% of contributors. Its spending on pensions was 6.49% of GDP in 2003. This regime 
has a surplus of 1.08% of GDP. 
b) Special System for the Self-employed. This includes everyone who works for themselves 
or is not dependent on an employer (apart from those covered by the Special Systems for 
Agricultural or Fisheries Workers). It accounts for 17% of contributors and pays out around 
13% of pensions. Its spending on pensions was 0.84% of GDP in 2003. This regime has a 
surplus of 0.25% of GDP. 
c) Special System for Agricultural Workers. This includes all those who normally work in 
agriculture, forestry or with livestock. It covers those who are employed by someone else as 
well as those who have their own smallholdings. It accounts for 21% of pensions and 7% of 
contributors. Its spending on pensions was 1.31% of GDP in 2003. This regime has a huge 
deficit of 1.12% of GDP. 
d) Special System for Fisheries Workers. This includes all employed and self-employed 
workers involved in fisheries activities on land and at sea. It accounts for 1.8% of pensions 
and 0.46% of contributors. This regime has a deficit of 0.15% of GDP. 
e) Special System for Coalmining. This applies to all those employed to work in coal mines. It 
accounts for just 0.1% of contributors but pays 1% of pensions. This regime has a deficit of 
0.13% of GDP. 
f) Special System for Domestic Staff. This covers those who provide exclusively domestic 
services for one or more heads of family. The services must be provided in the house where 
the head of family lives, and a wage or payment must be received in exchange. This regime 
accounts for 1.14% of contributors and pays out 2.8% of pensions. It has a deficit of 0.13% of 
GDP.   5
g) Apart from the special systems mentioned above, there are others covering civil servants, 
the armed forces and the judiciary. The most important of these is the one for civil servants. 
Coordination between the General and the various Special Systems is assured because the 
system is based on the following principles: i.) a common legal basis for the system as a 
whole; ii.) unique one-off registration details regardless of transfers between systems; and iii.) 
reciprocal calculation of quotas between the partial systems that make up the system as a 
whole. 
The most relevant rules for determining the amount of retirement pension are: 
1)  The pension base is calculated according to contributions made during the last 15 
years of work. Contributions for the 24 months immediately prior to retirement are 
taken at nominal value, while previous contribution rates are revalued in line with the 
Retail Price Index (RPI) for the months up to and including the 25th month before 
retirement. From this date begins the period of contribution rates taken at nominal 
value. 
2)  In the case of the General System, the pension is determined by applying the 
corresponding replacement rate to the pension base. This is variable according to the 
number of years contributed. A sliding scale is applied starting at 50% after 15 years 
contributions, rising by 3% for every additional year from the sixteenth to the twenty-
fifth, and by 2% from the twenty-sixth year up to a maximum of 100% for 35 years. 
When retirement pension is first claimed after age 65, a rate of 100% is applied plus 
an additional 2% for every full year contributed after that age, always assuming that 
35 years contributions have already been paid. The minimum retirement age is 60 
years. 
3)  The replacement rate is reduced by between 6% and 8% for each year the retirement 
age is brought forward from the legal retirement age of 65. 
4)  The pension increases annually in line with the RPI. 





Workers  Coalmining Fisheries Domestic 
Staff  Total
1980  3.39 3.84 1.22  0.84  1.67  4.13  2.46 
1985  2.81 3.11 1.04  0.74  1.40  2.29  2.11 
1993  2.65 3.10 0.74  0.44  0.96  0.86  1.83 
1994  2.46 3.08 0.72  0.41  0.89  0.78  1.77 
1995  2.44 3.07 0.71  0.38  0.73  0.73  1.77 
1996  2.39 3.03 0.71  0.36  0.68  0.71  1.76 
1997  2.40 2.99 0.72  0.34  0.65  0.70  1.78 
1998  2.47 2.99 0.72  0.28  0.63  0.69  1.83 
1999  2.58 3.01 0.73  0.26  0.62  0.72  1.91 
2000  2.69 3.00 0.72  0.24  0.62  0.74  1.98 
2001  2.77 2.97 0.72  0.22  0.61  0.76  2.04 
2002  2.82 2.94 0.73  0.20  0.59  0.87  2.08 
2003  2.85 2.93 0.75  0.19  0.58  0.93  2.12 
Source: “La Seguridad Social en el umbral del siglo XXI” for 1980 and 1985, with the rest 
compiled from http://www.mtas.es 
                                                 
5 The ratio between contributors and number of pensions is not strictly comparable for the last few years - from 
1990 onwards - as there has been a change in the way the data is broken down to calculate it.   6
Table 1 can be used to analyze the evolution of one of the most significant variables for 
understanding the main problem faced by the Spanish pension system: the ratio between the 
number of contributors and the number of pensions. As far as the totals are concerned, a 
downward trend can be seen up to 1996, but from then on they begin to increase. These 
variations are similar to those within the General System (it should not be forgotten that this is 
the system with the greatest relative weight) and the Special System for Domestic Workers 
(although the upward trend in this system began later), but unlike those in the other systems, 
where the trend is still downwards. The recovery of the General System is due to a much 
higher rate of growth in the number of contributors than in the number of pensions. 
Nevertheless, the figures still give cause for concern. 
III.-FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR THE SPANISH PENSION SYSTEM  
After a brief description of the main features of the public pension system in Spain, we 
analyze its future perspectives from the point of view of politicians, social agents, public 
opinion and experts, and then discuss its main problems and some of the measures put 
forward for solving them.  
At the beginning of the 90s, as Jimeno (2002) explains, the effects of the economic recession 
on the public budget and the need to carry out a certain amount of fiscal consolidation 
imposed by the requirements of the Treaty of Maastricht meant that “anxiety” over the 
pensions problem became more acute and much research was carried out as to the system's 
financial viability. In the papers published, which relied basically on simulation models, there 
is an almost general consensus that the current pension system would suffer serious problems 
in the short term if steps were not taken to correct the deviations that would come about 
mainly due to the ageing of the population. Another problem is that the system does not offer 
good labor incentives
6. 
Public opinion has been very concerned about the political use of the pension problem as an 
electoral weapon. According to Pérez-Díaz et al. (1997), there was growing awareness that 
there was a problem with pensions, even a gradual conviction that reforms were necessary and 
that the system in its current form could not go on indefinitely. As Alvira et al. (1996) noted, 
a great many people were worried about the future of their retirement revenue, and the public 
welfare system was seen in a negative light. Only those who had already retired had a positive 
opinion about the public system. During the economic expansion of the last few years there 
has been massive job creation and record numbers of affiliates on the registers. This has lifted 
much of the pressure off the public purse and has meant that the “pension problem” has 
shifted to a secondary level.  
The Spanish government only admits the possibility of carrying out parametric type reforms 
in the sense described by Holzmann et al. (2003). At present there is an atmosphere of 
unbridled joy because for the first time ever the reserve fund amounts to approximately 1.43% 
of GDP, with record numbers of contributors on the books. According to official sources, 
there are three measures considered essential for safeguarding the financial sustainability of 
the system: 
                                                 
6 This problem is not dealt with here. There is a great deal of literature on the (dis)incentives of the jobs market 
generated by the current pension system. On this subject see Boldrin, Dolado, Jimeno & Peracchi (1999), 
Boldrin et al. (1999, 2000a, & 2000b), Diamond (2001), Jiménez-Martín & Sánchez (2000 & 2001) & Jimeno 
(2000).   7
1)  The reference period for calculating the amount of pensions should be extended to 
cover the entire working life. 
2)  The money needed to cover the shortfall in some pensions and bring them up to 
minimum levels should be provided through general taxation
7. In other words, this 
explicit redistribution should be carried out through the non-contributory system since 
it is still paid for with the surplus from contributions, around 4,132 million euros in 
2003, i.e. 0.63% of GDP 30% of pensions are minimum rate. 
3)  There has to be a reduction in the avalanche of early retirements, which are preventing 
the real retirement age from being raised. 
We will be looking at a number of papers in which some very different methodologies are 
used to “prove” that the pension problem in Spain really is important despite the fact that the 
current government, like the previous ones, and the trade unions deny the size of the problem. 
This is because pension system reform is tremendously unpopular and the effects are only 
visible in the long term, far beyond the planning horizon of the government and trade unions, 
both of which tend to concentrate on the short term. 
The questions analyzed are the following: 
1)  Demographic projections. 
2)  Implicit debt. 
3)  Intragenerational fairness. 
4)  The financial solvency of the system. 
1)  Demographic projections 
According to Jimeno (2002), the general features of population ageing in Spain are:  
¾  Increased life expectancy - it has risen by more than 9 years, from 69.85 years in 1960 
to 79.08 in 2000 - will bring about an increase in the number of people over 65 as a 
proportion of the total population. 
¾  The decrease in birthrate, which in Spain has taken place later but with greater 
intensity and speed than in other countries, will also contribute to reducing the relative 
weight of the working age population over the next 50 years.  
¾  Immigration, which over the last five years has risen at an unprecedented rate in 
Spain, could mitigate the reduction in working age population.  
Although it is uncertain how these demographic variables might develop in the future, it 
appears inevitable that the ratio between the sizes of older and younger cohorts will increase 
noticeably during the first half of this century, even under the most optimistic scenarios. In 
this respect, the projections of the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, INE) (2001), which are shown in Table 2 in revised form so as to incorporate 
recent changes in mortality, birthrates and immigration in the second half of the 90s, imply 
that the ratio between the population over 65 and the population between 20 and 64 will 
increase from 27% in 2001 up to 36% in 2025, reaching approximately 60% in 2050.  
                                                 
7 The amount added to the pension if it is less than the minimum pension guaranteed under the general system.   8
Table 2: Population projections for Spain 2002-2050 based on the 2001 census by the National 
Institute of Statistics 







2002  227,000  1.279 83.07 75.72  40.683 
2003  204,000  1.308 83.27 75.83  40.935 
2004  181,000  1.327 83.39 75.94  41.167 
2005  160,000  1.361 83.55 76.05  41.379 
2010  160,000  1.424 84.35 76.58  42.359 
2020  160,000  1.424 85.10 77.27  43.378 
2030  160,000  1.424 85.10 77.65  43.369 
2040  160,000  1.424 85.10 77.65  42.744 
2050  160,000  1.424 85.10 77.65  41.200 
Hypothesis I or central scenario 
Source: www.ine.es 
Montero (2000) analyzes the effects the progressive ageing of the population will have on 
financing Social Security in Spain. She confirms that, if current contribution rates remain 
constant, the government will not be able to guarantee future retirees current levels of 
pensions. For this to be achieved, the contribution rate will have to be increased by 10 points, 
up to 36.4%. According to the author, increasing the age of retirement
8 will enable current 
pension levels to be maintained without having to increase contribution rates. 
2)  Implicit debt 
Bonin et al. (2001) estimate the implicit debt
9 built up by the current pension system in 1996 
at 175.7% of the GDP for that year. As a continuation of the work done in that paper, Gil & 
Patxot (2002) explore the possibility of introducing reform policies on the revenue side so as 
to lessen the strong demographic dependence of Social Security revenue. They conclude that 
the severity of the demographic crisis makes this type of measure clearly insufficient for 
restoring the intergenerational equilibrium and that if the current configuration of the pension 
system is maintained indefinitely, this will be likely to transfer to future generations a volume 
of debt that would vary between 167% and 206% of the GDP for 1996. To overcome this gap 
in sustainability, revenue would need to be increased by between 3.97% and 4.89% of GDP 
every year.
  
The above calculation is an underestimate for two main reasons: 
1.-Early retirement is considered to be eliminated. 
2.-It does not take into account the Special System for Civil Servants. 
Redecillas (1996) estimates the implicit debt at 31 December 1994 at 2.1 times the GDP, 
excluding the Special System for Civil Servants (another 0.3 times the GDP), while Abio et 
al. (1999) estimate it at twice the GDP for 1996. This debt grows sharply over time. 
According to Redecillas (1996), the pension rights of the Social Security (pensioners) grew 
                                                 
8 As shown by Boldrin et al. (1999), much of the increase in spending on pensions that came about in many EU 
countries during the last quarter of the twentieth century was due to lowering the effective age of retirement. 
9 Accrued-to-date liabilities: These represent the present value of pensions to be paid in the future on the basis of 
accrued rights; neither the future contributions nor the accrual of the new rights they imply are considered. For 
the terminology on pension liabilities, see Holzmann (1998).   9
from 0.9 times GDP in 1989 to 1.04 times five years later, at the rate of almost 3 percentage 
points of GDP per year. 
3)  Intragenerational fairness 
Another aspect to be taken into account in a contributory pension system is intragenerational 
fairness, which should be understood to mean that all members of the same generation should 
be able to obtain a similar return on contributions paid, independently of the sector in which 
they were employed. In this case the way the Social Security system in Spain is divided into a 
series of special systems leads to differences in the way individuals of the same generation are 
treated.  Monasterio et al. (1996) analyze the different options used by contributors to 
maximize their revenue and 'beat the system'. So far, in June 2004, no legislation has yet been 
passed to counteract most of the problems described. 
On this subject, Bandrés & Cuenca (1998) examine to what extent the modifications adopted 
regarding retirement pensions achieve one of the aims declared in the 1997 legislation (the 
most important pensions legislation of recent years): the strengthening of the system's 
fairness.  
To do this they analyze the amount of variation between the pensions payable to and the 
contributions paid by pensioners retiring under the terms of the 1997 law. The quantification 
is done mainly by using the transfer component, which is defined as that part of the pension 
received which exceeds the amount of a pension maintaining actuarial equilibrium between 
contributions and pension, and which, therefore, can be interpreted as a transfer. This enables 
the entire intergenerational transfer that new pensioners receive to be quantified, as well as the 
different intragenerational transfers by the Social Security system. An empirical study is 
carried out on the cohort of pensioners who started to receive pensions in 1993. The results 
appear in Tables 3 and 4. 
  Table 3: Transfer components and Real Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Law 26/1985 
(by system as a percentage of total pensions paid) 
Transfer component   
System  Initial neutral 
pension 
Total 
Transfer  Transfer to 
initial pension 
Minimum 
complement  IRR (real)
General  79.49 20.51  18.25  2.26  3.86 








31.76 68.24  55.90 12.34  10.58 
Domestic staff  24.54 75.46  50.08 25.39  16.10 
Total  71.45 28.55  24.13  4.42  4.70 
Source: Bandrés & Cuenca (1998). 
The retirement pension reforms approved in 1997 would reduce the transfer component from 
28.55% of total pensions under 1985 legislation to 21.65% if the new method of calculation 
were applied simultaneously.  
The repercussions on the various separate systems are very different: while the special 
systems appear to be almost unaffected by the new regulations, the transfer component of the 
General System would be reduced from 20.51% to 11.55%, which means we can assume that   10
this is the system the reform was aimed at. A reduction in the rate of return can also be seen 
for the different systems, although the greatest reduction comes about in the General System. 
Table 4: Transfer components and Real Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Law 24/1997 
(by system as a percentage of the total pensions paid) 
Transfer component   
System  Initial neutral 
pension 
Total 
transfer  Transfer to 
initial pension 
Minimum 
complement  IRR (real)
General  88.45 11.55  7.55  4.00  3.15 








32.82 67.18  46.30 20.88  10.36 
Domestic staff  25.39 74.61  35.97 38.64  15.79 
Total  78.35 21.65  13.86  7.79  4.06 
Source: Bandrés & Cuenca (1998). 
4)  Financial (actuarial) solvency of the system 
Another way of focusing on the problem of pension systems is based on work carried out by 
Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966), which is still completely valid and widely quoted in the 
literature: a pension system financed by PAYG or through intergenerational transfers will 
only be viable in the long term if its internal rate of return (IRR) does not exceed the growth 
rate of earnings plus the stable growth rate of the contributing population, i.e. if it does not 
exceed the growth of the system's tax base. Therefore the financial viability of the PAYG 
system will be linked to average economic growth sustainable in the long term, and this in 
turn will be the benchmark for setting the sustainability of the system. Devesa et al. (2000 & 
2002) calculate the real IRR of the General System. The average value of the IRR - around 
4.25% for retirement ages close to the legal age - is much higher than the average GDP over 
the last 30 years (1970-2000), an annual accumulative rate of around 3%. It can be concluded 
that, should average economic growth not reach a certain level, the current configuration of 
the retirement pension system in Spain is not sustainable in the Samuelson-Aaron sense. 
Jimeno (2002), bringing a previous work up to date (Jimeno (2000)), also arrives at similar 
conclusions using a simple formula to analyze the components of pension costs. The paper 
forecasts pension costs in relation to GDP in 2025 and 2050 based on certain assumptions 
regarding the future evolution of the four factors shown. 
These forecasts are represented in three scenarios, two of which determine the percentage of 
spending in relation to GDP and one which determines what the percentage ratio between 
average pension and average output should be to enable a certain level of spending on 
pensions in relation to GDP to be maintained. The results are shown in Table 5 and lead us to 
conclude that maintaining spending on pensions in relation to GDP at acceptable levels, even 
in the most favorable scenario, would require the regulations governing the way pensions are 
calculated to be reformed. At the same time they also show that there is an urgent need to set 
up alternative ways of financing pension costs, although, as the author points out, resorting to 
alternative sources of finance (general revenues, for example) is not exempt from problems, 
since a significant increase in the weight of general taxation in financing pension costs would 
substantially alter the essence of the Social Security contributory programs by breaking the 
existing link between contributions and benefits.    11
Table 5: Forecast spending on pensions for 2025 and 2050 
2001 
Population between 20-64 (in millions)  25.2 
Population over 65 (in millions)  6.9 
Number of pensions (in millions)  7.7 
Employment (in millions)  16.0 
Pensions/Population over 65  1.12 
Population over 65/Population between 20-64 (%)  27.4 
Rate of employment (%)  63.5 
Average pension/Average output (%)  17.1 
Spending on pensions/GDP (%)  8.3 
2025 
Population between 20-64 (in millions)  26.0 26.0 26.0 
Population over 65 (in millions)  9.4 9.4 9.4 
Number of pensions (in millions)  10.5 10.8 10.8 
Employment (in millions)  16.9 18.2 19.2 
Pensions/Population over 65  1.12  1.15  1.15 
Population over 65/Population between  20-64  (%)  36.2 36.2 36.2 
Rate of employment (%)  65  70  70 
Average pension/Average output (%)  17  20  20.2 
Spending on pensions/GDP (%)  10.6 11.9  12 
2050 
Population between 20-64 (in millions)  23.3 23.3 23.3 
Population over 65 (in millions)  12.8 12.8 12.8 
Number of pensions (in millions)  14.3 14.7 14.7 
Employment (in millions)  15.1 16.3 17.2 
Pensions/Population over 65  1.12  1.15  1.15 
Population over 65/Population between 20-64 (%)  60  60  60 
Rate of employment (%)  65  70  70 
Average pension/Average output (%)  17  20  12.2 
Spending on pensions/GDP (%)  17.6 19.7  12 
Source: Jimeno (2002) 
The last paper analyzed is by Alonso & Herce (2003), in which they continue, expand, correct 
and modify their previous papers
10. Recent population forecasts have been drawn up by the 
National Institute of Statistics for a horizon of 2050 taking into account scenarios which 
include immigration, something which up to now has not been considered in Spain. They 
analyze the consequences of immigration on forecasts for costs and revenue for the Spanish 
contributory pension system by establishing a central projection and then analyzing its 
sensitivity to different hypotheses regarding immigration, growth in output and different ways 
of calculating the pension base.  
The work is developed using the MODPENS (Modelo de Pensiones) model (similar to the 
PROST model) by FEDEA
11. The basis for this paper are the demographic and 
macroeconomic scenarios in which the hypotheses are established - the former already 
described in comments about the paper by Jimeno (2002). MODPENS is an accounting model 
which does not consider behavior reactions. Nevertheless, apart from this limitation the model 
                                                 
10 See especially the papers by Herce & Alonso (2000a & 2000b), Herce (2000) & Herce & Pérez-Díaz (1995). 
The authors consider it natural that exercises in projections should be repeated at regular intervals to take into 
account new economic and demographic circumstances, changes in legislation, improvements in methodology 
and the need to explore new hypotheses. 
11 FEDEA (Fundación de Economía Aplicada) is a private, non-profit making institution that obtains part of its 
operating resources from a capital fund set up by its sponsors. Its objective is to carry out studies that contribute 
to the analysis, diagnosis and discussion of Spanish economic problems, applying the principles of economic 
analysis and using rigorous scientific methods and independent judgement.   12
is useful because of the information it supplies about the different systems and numbers of 
affiliates and pensioners by age and sex. 
Table 6: Projections for the Spanish contributory pension system 2003-2050. Central scenario. 
  2003 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Affiliated workers
12  16,448 16,777 17,113 18,333 19,146 19,416 19,303 18,870 18,115 17,133 16,240 15,767
Unemployed
13  657 615 568 365 282 286 284 278 266 252 239 232 
Number of pensions
14  7,894 7,998 8,098 8,164 8,584 9,176 9,955  10,830 11,712 12,432 12,856 12,761
Ratio 
affiliates/pensioners 








9.75 9.75 9.74 9.33 9.71  10.40  11.42 12.71 14.29 15.87 17.12 17.23 
Surplus or deficit  0.92 0.90 0.89 1.21 0.79 0.10 -0.92  -2.21 -3.80 -5.39 -6.65 -6.77 
Accumulated fund or 
debt
17 
1.43 2.33 3.23 8.67  14.04  16.82  15.53  8.18  -7.26  -32.72 -68.46 -109.1 
Source: Alonso & Herce (2003) and own. 
Conditional upon the assumptions being fulfilled, the results shown in Table 6 suggest that, 
despite the census of the immigrant population implied by the most optimistic assumptions, 
long-term spending on pensions will continue to be appreciably greater than revenue from 
contributions, although in the short and medium term the amount of money in the system may 
show a marked increase. Naturally, the greater the migratory fluxes are, the smaller the 
financial insufficiency will be and the later it will appear. Similarly a rapid advance in output 
will defer the time and size of the system's financial insufficiency because pensions cannot 
capture output gains in the same proportion as salaries can, which would imply the relative 
impoverishment of pensioners. Job creation will sooner or later run up against a lack of 
manpower despite the steady influx of immigrants, and immigration cannot be depended upon 
for the system's long-term financial sufficiency even though it may have been its mainstay in 
the recent past. Finally, increasing the period for calculating the pension base of the pension 
has appreciable effects depending on the number of years taken into account. Faced with a 
problematic long-term central scenario, extreme scenarios as good or bad as desired can be 
considered, but they will be even more improbable.  
All the papers analyzed have highlighted that: 
-  The current configuration of the pension system is not the best possible. 
-  Financial solvency cannot be achieved with the current system. 
-  The current system is not actuarially fair. 
                                                 
12 Annual average in thousands. 
13 Annual average in thousands. The Department of Employment (Instituto Nacional de Empleo, INEM) makes 
contributions for them to Social Security at the minimum contribution rate. 
14 At the end of year, in thousands. Currently there are around 1.1 pensions to each pensioner. 
15 As a percentage of GDP, including contributions for temporary incapacity. 
16 As a percentage of GDP, including benefits for temporary incapacity, industrial injury, industrial disease and 
administration costs. 
17 The surplus for each year is added to that of the year before or the deficit subtracted. Returns on the fund or 
interest on debt are included in each case. The real interest rate is assumed to be 3%. This amount is not the 
implicit debt, which would clearly be far higher.    13
The situation described in this section caused radical reforms to be proposed following the 
philosophy that big problems need big solutions. The reforms concentrated on the progressive 
abandonment of the PAYG system and a move towards a funded system. The idea behind them 
was that pensions would be guaranteed with a larger amount than in the current system and, in 
addition to this, it would stimulate savings and economic growth. Bailén & Gil (1996) and Piñera 
& Weinstein (1996) were the first to propose these reforms. According to them, changing the 
system would take away the commitment to pay pensions from the State's accounts, would 
provide better individual pensions at a lower cost than the current system, and increase personal 
saving, the accumulation of private capital and economic growth.  
Another proposal was put forward by Herce et al. (1996). They defend the argument that the 
transition to a mixed system is not only possible but desirable because it would enable those 
workers who wanted to partially withdraw from the PAYG system and deposit part of their 
contributions in a private pension fund to do so in such a way that, on retirement, they would 
receive an revenue made up of the sum of both pensions. According to the authors, the advantage 
of their system compared to one of total substitution is based on the fact that, on the one hand, 
there would be less coercion towards participants since no worker would lose the option of 
remaining within the Social Security system, and on the other hand, the transition from the 
current PAYG model to the mixed model would be easier to finance given that the reduction in 
monies entering the public system would not be extremely high because no worker would stop 
making contributions to Social Security. 
Along similar lines, Herce (2001) again proposes that the partial privatization of public pensions 
could bring net advantages for future pensioners, and so radical reform of the pension system 
should be undertaken as soon as possible. However, he makes no definite proposal as to how the 
transition should be made. 
The reform proposals above have been rejected for five main reasons: 
1)  They meet with the unanimous opposition of all political parties and trade unions.  
2)  It would not be easy to take on the transition costs due to the enormous implicit debt 
accumulated. 
3)  Maintaining the current market (complementary system) and commission structure 
would mean high administration costs for contributors, see Devesa et al. (2002a, 
2002b & 2003), 
4)  The bad experiences associated with the real returns achieved by the private pension 
plan system over the last few years have made the Spanish population generally 
skeptical about the functioning of capital markets. 
5)  As mentioned before, there has been massive job creation and record numbers of 
affiliates on the registers over the last few years, and this has meant that the “pension 
problem” has shifted to a secondary level. 
IV.-ISSUES SURROUNDING THE INTRODUCTION OF A SYSTEM OF 
NOTIONAL DEFINED CONTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS 
As described in the previous section, various proposals for reforming the pension system have 
been put forward and rejected in recent years. The aim of this section is to measure the effect 
that pension formulas based on notional account philosophy would have had on the initial   14
amount of retirement pension and on the system's internal rate of return if they had been 
introduced in Spain. 
The first paper to truly link the Spanish contributory pension system with notional accounts is 
the one by Devesa & Vidal (2004). They simulate the effect that would have been brought 
about by the introduction of regulations similar to those applying to the first and/or second 
pillar in the reformed pension systems of Brazil, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden. The 
simulation uses data for Spain for the following variables as benchmarks for calculating the 
pension: variation in the RPI, variation in average earnings (AEI), variation in the nominal 
GDP, and the total Social Security contributions index (TSSCI). The evolution of the 
variables used for this calculation can be seen in Graph 1. A great degree of volatility can be 
seen over the years, with the highest values being reached in the mid-70s. 
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Table 7: Ratio between the initial pension in Spain (current system) and the initial pension using 




SWEDEN ITALY  BRAZIL  POLAND  LATVIA 
15  2.49 2.83 2.23 4.09 2.77 
20  2.43 2.48 2.22 4.14 2.51 
25  2.39 2.27 2.25 4.30 2.47 
30  2.24 2.14 2.26 4.32 2.31 
35  2.11 2.08 2.30 4.37 2.19 
40  1.85 1.86 2.19 4.09 1.93 
Source: Devesa & Vidal (2004) 
NB: Retirement age 65 and last salary equal to 100% of maximum pensionable earnings for 2002. 
Table 7 shows the ratio between the initial pension in Spain and the initial pensions that 
would have been provided by retirement formulas based on notional defined contribution 
accounts as an approximation of the rules for calculating applied in Sweden, Italy, Brazil, 
Poland and Latvia.   15
The value underlined in Table 7 indicates that a person in Spain who retires at age 65 after 
contributing for 25 years obtains an initial pension 2.25 times greater than would have been 
obtained under Brazilian regulations. As can be seen, the ratio between the pension calculated 
according to rules in force in Spain in 2003 and the pension calculated with the data for Spain 
but using the calculation rules from countries with notional account systems does not 
fluctuate much according to the number of years contributed. 
The fact that pensions are indexed according to different variables and different coefficients 
makes the initial pension an unsuitable element for comparison, and therefore “forces” 
comparisons to be made with reference to the IRR (see Table 8 for data on the IRR). Its value, 
calculated according to the rules in force in Spain for 2003, is much higher than the other 
values obtained by applying the rules from other countries except in the case of 10 years 
contributions. This is because, according to those rules, pension entitlement in Spain only 
starts after 15 years contributions. The highest IRR in Spain is for 15 years contributions, and 
it decreases from then on. The real IRR for women is always higher than for men because the 
amount of pension is the same but the probability of survival after retirement age (used for 
calculating the real IRR) is greater. It is also useful to note that under no set of rules does the 
IRR exceed 3.6%. This is the value of the average growth of GDP in Spain over the last 40 
years and connects with the maximum value that should be shown by the IRR of a PAYG 
pension system for it to be sustainable in the Samuelson sense. 




SPAIN SWEDEN ITALY  BRAZIL POLAND LATVIA 
10  - ∞ (- ∞)  2.09 (3.33)  0.61 (1.91)  3.01 (4.22)  -0.45 (0.93)  0.96 (2.26) 
15  7.75 (8.58)  1.91 (2.97)  1.15 (2.24)  2.57 (3.61)  -0.44 (0.76)  1.44 (2.54) 
20  6.54 (7.27)  1.78 (2.71)  1.67 (2.61)  2.26 (3.17)  -0.46 (0.61)  1.75 (2.69) 
25  5.82 (6.47)  1.76 (2.59)  2.00 (2.82)  2.04 (2.85)  -0.49 (0.49)  1.75 (2.59) 
30  5.34 (5.95)  1.93 (2.68)  2.13 (2.87)  1.90 (2.66)  -0.45 (0.46)  1.91 (2.68) 
35  5.07 (5.64)  2.15 (2.84)  2.21 (2.91)  1.81 (2.52)  -0.38 (0.49)  2.11 (2.82) 
40  4.63 (5.17)  2.37 (3.02)  2.36 (3.01)  1.74 (2.42)  -0.29 (0.54)  2.32 (2.98) 
Source: Devesa & Vidal (2004) 
NB: Retirement age 65 and last salary equal to 100% of maximum pensionable earnings for 2002. 
According to the data in Table 9, the replacement rate in all cases is increasing according to 
the age of retirement. However, according to the real IRR the results are not so clear. With the 
Swedish rules, according to the IRR, deferring retirement age is penalized more. No clear 
incentive exists under Italian rules either. Brazilian and Latvian regulations do give favorable 
treatment to deferring retirement age. Polish rules are a special case: the real IRR for men is 
negative due to the way the initial pension is calculated, and becomes lower and lower, while 
for women it is positive and practically constant. In the case of Spain, the graph line is in the 
shape of a hump, reaching its maximum at age 65. 
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Table 9: Real Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Replacement Rate (RR) for retirement age Xj, 






SPAIN SWEDEN ITALY BRAZIL POLAND  LATVIA 
IRR  3.69 (4.22)  2.31 (2.90) 2.26 (2.86) 1.56 (2.19) -0.26 (0.50)  2.01 (2.63)  60 
(35)  RR  56 38 38 31  17  34 
IRR  4.06 (4.59)  2.28 (2.89) 2.21 (2.83) 1.61 (2.26) -0.29 (0.50)  2.03 (2.67)  61 
(35)  RR  63 39 39 33  18  36 
IRR  4.37 (4.91)  2.25 (2.88) 2.23 (2.86) 1.65 (2.32) -0.31 (0.50)  2.05 (2.71)  62 
(35)  RR  71 40 40 34  19  37 
IRR  4.65 (5.20)  2.21 (2.87) 2.24 (2.90) 1.70 (2.38) -0.33 (0.49)  2.07 (2.74)  63 
(35)  RR  78 41 42 36  19  39 
IRR  4.90 (5.45)  2.18 (2.86) 2.26 (2.93) 1.76 (2.45) -0.36 (0.49)  2.09 (2.78)  64 
(35)  RR  85 42 43 38  20  40 
IRR  5.07 (5.64)  2.15 (2.84) 2.21 (2.91) 1.81 (2.52) -0.38 (0.49)  2.11 (2.82)  65 
(35)  RR  92 43 44 40  21  42 
IRR  4.96 (5.55)  2.11 (2.83) 2.24 (2.95) 1.86 (2.59) -0.40 (0.48)  2.13 (2.86)  66 
(35)  RR  92 45 46 42  22  44 
IRR  4.84 (5.45)  2.08 (2.81) 2.27 (2.99) 1.92 (2.66) -0.43 (0.48)  2.15 (2.89)  67 
(35)  RR  92 46 48 44  23  46 
IRR  4.71 (5.34)  2.05 (2.79) 2.19 (2.93) 1.98 (2.74) -0.45 (0.47)  2.18 (2.93)  68 
(35)  RR  92 48 49 47  24  48 
IRR  4.58 (5.22)  2.01 (2.78) 2.14 (2.90) 2.05 (2.81) -0.47 (0.46)  2.20 (2.97)  69 
(35)  RR  92 49 51 50  25  50 
IRR  4.43 (5.10)  1.98 (2.76) 2.18 (2.93) 2.12 (2.89) -0.49 (0.45)  2.23 (3.01)  70 
(35)  RR  92 51 53 53  26  53 
Source: Devesa & Vidal (2004) 
NB: Last salary equal to 100% of maximum pensionable earnings for 2002. 
From Table 10 it can be seen that the replacement rate is once again increasing according to 
retirement age in all cases. If the values for the real IRR are taken as a benchmark, the results 
are clearer than in the case of the data from Table 9. Generally speaking, the value of the real 
IRR now increases with retirement age under the rules of those countries with a notional 
accounts system. With the rules applied in Brazil and Latvia, the favorable treatment given on 
deferring retirement age can be seen more clearly. Polish rules continue to give slightly 
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Table 10: Real Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Replacement Rate (RR) for retirement age Xj, 






SPAIN SWEDEN ITALY BRAZIL POLAND  LATVIA 
IRR  3.79 (4.36)  2.12 (2.76) 2.18 (2.82) 1.63 (2.30) -0.32 (0.48)  1.82 (2.49)  60 
(30)  RR  50 33 33 29  16  30 
IRR  4.15 (4.72)  2.12 (2.78) 2.14 (2.80) 1.66 (2.34) -0.34 (0.48)  1.87 (2.56)  61 
(31)  RR  58 35 35 31  17  32 
IRR  4.46 (5.02)  2.12 (2.79) 2.17 (2.83) 1.70 (2.39) -035 (0.48)  1.93 (2.62)  62 
(32)  RR  66 37 37 33  18  34 
IRR  4.71 (5.27)  2.13 (2.81) 2.20 (2.87) 1.73 (2.43) -0.36 (0.48)  1.99 (2.68)  63 
(33)  RR  75 39 40 35  19  36 
IRR  4.93 (5.49)  2.14 (2.82) 2.24 (2.92) 1.77 (2.47) -0.37 (0.48)  2.05 (2.75)  64 
(34)  RR  84 41 42 37  20  39 
IRR  5.07 (5.64)  2.15 (2.84) 2.21 (2.91) 1.81 (2.52) -0.38 (0.49)  2.11 (2.82)  65 
(35)  RR  92 43 44 40  21  42 
IRR  5.11 (5.69)  2.16 (2.86) 2.27 (2.96) 1.85 (2.57) -0.39 (0.49)  2.17 (2.89)  66 
(36)  RR  92 46 47 43  22  45 
IRR  5.15 (5.76)  2.18 (2.88) 2.33 (3.03) 1.89 (2.62) -0.39 (0.50)  2.24 (2.96)  67 
(37)  RR  92 49 51 45  24  48 
IRR  5.19 (5.82)  2.19 (2.91) 2.28 (2.99) 1.94 (2.66) -0.39 (0.50)  2.31 (3.03)  68 
(38)  RR  92 52 53 48  25  52 
IRR  5.23 (5.88)  2.21 (2.93) 2.27 (2.98) 1.98 (2.71) -0.39 (0.51)  2.38 (3.10)  69 
(39)  RR  92 55 56 52  27  56 
IRR  5.28 (5.94)  2.23 (2.95) 2.34 (3.05) 2.03 (2.76) -0.39 (0.51)  2.45 (3.17)  70 
(40)  RR  92 58 60 55  28  60 
Source: Devesa & Vidal (2004) 
NB: 30 years contributions for a retirement age of 60, increasing the number of years contributed by 1 as 
retirement age is deferred by 1 year. Last salary equal to 100% of maximum pensionable earnings for 
2002. 
As we have just shown, the introduction in Spain of notional retirement formulas similar to 
those applied in some other countries would have the effect of noticeably reducing the amount 
of pensions currently in payment, which have been calculated using pension formulas based 
on traditional defined benefits. The current theoretical replacement rate for someone retiring 
at 65 with 35 years contributions would change from 92% to a range of values between 42% 
and 44%, depending on the formula chosen. In addition to this, the real theoretical IRR 
expected from the contributions would change from over 5.35% to less than 2.5% with any of 
the formulas applied. These values are in greater harmony with the real average growth of 
GDP in Spain over the last 40 years (3.6%), which should undoubtedly be the reference for 
the system to aim at in order to be financially viable in the Samuelson sense. At the same 
time, it could be the justification for introducing a notional accounts system in Spain.  
Another positive effect of introducing this type of retirement formula in Spain could be to 
slow down the trend towards early retirement. The current formula, which applies decreasing 
weight to the years of contributions paid, is not the best example of good design in this sense.  
Similarly, if the notional accounts system had been adopted, the current system would have 
built up extensive reserves - with the government's authorization - which, according to Alonso 
and Herce (2003), would enable the future “lack of manpower” to be considered more calmly.    18
It seems clear, therefore, that the introduction of a notional accounts system would to a great 
extent correct the deficiencies seen in the Spanish system. This reform should aim at 
achieving as far as possible the following objectives: 
1)  Narrow the relationship between contributions and benefits, i.e. increase the actuarial 
fairness of the system. 
2)  Carry out redistribution in the most transparent way possible. 
3)  Reduce the risk of political manipulation.  
4)  Reach a financial stability that would stand up to the demographic and economic 
changes that affect the system itself. 
5)  Mitigate or weaken the disincentive to work which is present in the current system. 
6)  Eliminate or minimize the actuarial deficit of the system. 
It is difficult for parametric reforms to achieve the above aims. They also tend to just patch 
things up to keep them going long enough to be handed on to other governments and 
generations, since they usually involve a series of mild measures that lengthen and complicate 
pension calculation via countless partial, transitory arrangements.  
Finally, another interesting objective - the generation of financial savings managed by the 
private sector - could be achieved by strengthening the complementary systems and/or 
rerouting part of the contributions towards a funded system, which would enable sources of 
retirement revenue and the risks inherent in the pension system in general to be diversified. 
V.-PROPOSAL: A NEW FORMULA FOR CALCULATING RETIREMENT 
PENSION AND THE TRANSITION PROCESS. 
If, as seen in the previous section, the introduction of a notional accounts system were being 
seriously considered for the beneficial effect it would have on the system as a whole by 
notably improving its financial viability and generating greater work incentives, one 
important question remains. Given that the risk is transferred explicitly to the contributors and 
beneficiaries, the question would be to determine the formula for calculating the pension that 
would best fit the degree of risk aversion of the contributor-beneficiary. The notional rates 
that would be used to revalue both the contributions and the pensions therefore need to be 
determined.  
The methodology used was developed in the paper by Vidal et al. (2004) and (2005), who 
quantify the aggregate “economic” risk to which the beneficiary would be exposed if it were 
decided to introduce a retirement pension system based on notional account philosophy in 
Spain. For this they used scenario generation techniques to make projections of the factors 
determining the real expected IRR (Internal rate of return) for the beneficiary according to 
sixteen retirement formulas based on the RPI (Retail Price Index), the GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product), the Average Earnings Index (AEI), and Total Social Security Contributions Index 
(TSSCI). These projections are based on Herce and Alonso's macroeconomic scenario 2000-
2050 (2000a) and include information about the past performance of the indexes and the time 
period for which the forecast is wanted.    19
The models used to calculate the initial retirement pension and its later variation based on the 
system of notional defined contribution accounts are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11: Formulas for calculating the initial pension and its later variation. 





Notional rate for pensions 
1  RPI GDP  RPI 
2  RPI AEI  RPI 
3  RPI GDP  RPI±GDP differential 
4  RPI GDP  RPI±AEI differential 
5  RPI AEI  RPI±GDP differential 
6  RPI AEI  RPI±AEI differential 
7  RPI TSSCI  RPI 
8  RPI TSSCI  RPI±TSSCI differential 
11  AEI GDP  RPI 
12  AEI AEI  RPI 
13  AEI GDP  RPI±GDP differential 
14  AEI GDP  RPI±AEI differential 
15  AEI AEI  RPI±GDP differential 
16  AEI AEI  RPI±AEI differential 
17  AEI TSSCI  RPI 
18  AEI TSSCI  RPI±TSSCI differential 
Source: Vidal et al. (2004)  
RPI (Retail Price Index), the GDP (Gross Domestic Product), the Average Earnings Index 
(AEI), and Total Social Security Contributions Index (TSSCI) 
The results for the average expected replacement rate for each of the formulas proposed can 
be seen in Table 12. 
Table 12: Average expected replacement rate. 
Retirement age 65. 
Average expected  
replacement rate  Model Group 
11 























Source: Vidal et al. (2004) 
After forty years of contributing, the formula that provides the best replacement rate is the one 
for around 46.5%. This is in sharp contrast to the replacement rate currently supplied by the 
system, which is around 92%. If the notional accounts system were applied, in the best of   20
cases the initial pension would reach 51% of that obtained under the present PAYG system 
applying in Spain. If people started work at 20 instead of 25, these replacement rates would be 
slightly higher, reaching 49% in the case of group 1.  
Much of this difference can be attributed to the way the current pension calculation formula is 
designed. If the whole working life were considered when calculating the pension base - as is 
advisable in contributory systems which aim at proportionality - instead of taking the last 15 
years of contributions into account, then the replacement rate would have been about 75% for 
a person retiring at age 65 with 40 years contributions. 
The results obtained for the average expected IRR are shown separately for men and women 
in Table 13 along with the percentage of expected deviation from the IRR for each model. 
Five basic aspects need to be highlighted: 
1)  The analysis of the average IRR shows clear differences between men and women. 
This discrepancy comes about because the joint average life expectancy of men and 
women at retirement age was used when calculating the initial pension. Given that 
women have a higher life expectancy, the expected return on contributions is much 
higher. 
2)  If Tables 12 and 13 are compared, no clear relation between the replacement rate and 
the IRR can be seen. This is because the replacement rate refers exclusively to the 
initial pension and, in addition, the contribution effort made is not taken into account. 
The IRR, however, relates all the probable inflows and outflows, and takes into 
account how the pension can vary over time. 
Table 13: Average Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and expected 
deviation for men (M) and women (W). Retirement age 65. 
Model  IRRM 
average 
IRRM 
deviation % DevM  IRRW 
average 
IRRW 
deviation % DevW 
14  0.02492 0.01148 46.06% 0.03441 0.01192 34.64% 
5  0.02491 0.01203 48.31% 0.03440 0.01364 39.65% 
16  0.02490 0.01331 53.45% 0.03437 0.01372 39.90% 
6  0.02489 0.0133 53.43% 0.03437  0.01349 39.26% 
15  0.02489 0.01208 48.53% 0.03437 0.01234 35.92% 
3  0.02488 0.01022 41.08% 0.03436 0.01065 31.00% 
1  0.02486 0.00796 32.02% 0.03435 0.00823 23.94% 
13  0.02485 0.01035 41.64% 0.03433 0.01057 30.79% 
11  0.02483 0.00791 31.84% 0.03433 0.00819 23.86% 
12  0.02482 0.00991 39.90% 0.03431 0.00997 29.07% 
17  0.02111 0.01186 56.19% 0.03065 0.01169 38.14% 
7  0.02101 0.01164 55.42% 0.03064 0.01166 38.04% 
8  0.02097 0.01651 78.73% 0.03064 0.01682 54.89% 
18  0.02097 0.01651 78.74% 0.03064 0.01682 54.91% 
2  0.02046 0.00666 32.57% 0.02970 0.00667 22.47% 
4  0.01926 0.00729 37.84% 0.02845 0.00755 26.56% 
Source: Vidal et al. (2004) 
3)  There are only very small differences between the real average expected IRR for both 
men and women in the first ten models. This seems to indicate that the participant-
beneficiary could choose any of these models using his or her degree of risk aversion 
as a basis for making the decision.    21
4)  The values obtained for the real IRR appear to be surprisingly low, but in fact they are 
not that low as the calculation is being considered a priori. The values will increase 
proportionally as the contributor is assumed to grow older. With similar assumptions, 
and assuming current Spanish legislation constant for the whole time period 
considered, the real IRR would be 4.05% and 4.93% for men and women respectively. 
However, it would be best to qualify the above figures since the value of the IRR in 
the defined benefit PAYG system does not include possible future reductions in its 
value because it is calculated in a system in which financial equilibrium is 
presupposed. Future pensioners will probably have to make greater contributions 
(through tax increases) and/or receive smaller pensions. In other words, if the defined 
benefit system intends to respect its acquired commitments to members, it must be 
because available financial resources exist to cover the system's future deficit. If these 
funds were used in the notional accounts system, this would provide a larger pension, 
thereby reducing the IRR differential. 
5)  The average values undergo deviations, which imply that those models that generate a 
greater deviation of the IRR relative to the average IRR are riskier. The listing in order 
of deviation is the same for men and women as they depend on the same volatility 
factors. Model 18 shows the highest risk in terms of typical deviation, while Model 11 
has the least. In general terms, IRR deviation for women is greater than for men.  
To summarize, it can be concluded from what has just been set out that: 
1)  The a priori average expected IRR for both men and women, following any of the 
formulas tested based on representative indices of relevant macroeconomic variables, 
is quite clearly lower than the IRR awarded today on contributory retirement pensions 
by current Spanish legislation. The envisaged replacement rate in the most favourable 
formula barely reaches 50.5% of that obtained today. This only goes to highlight the 
profound structural actuarial imbalance present in the current configuration of the 
defined benefit retirement pension system in Spain.  
2)  The preferred models for both male and female beneficiaries who are neutral to risk 
are 14 and 5, in descending order. The first of these capitalizes the contributions in 
line with the expected evolution of the GDP; the second follows the AEI. In both cases 
the pensions can participate in the probable upward fluctuations of the salaries index 
above that foreseen.  
3)  Some contributor-beneficiaries with a different risk profile may prefer retirement 
formulas different to those in the paragraph above. It would not be impossible to 
provide a certain degree of freedom of choice as regards the preferred formula 
according to the contributor's perception of risk and the evolution and forecast 
pathway of the indices. Involving the individual in taking decisions as to the model he 
considers most suitable will make him feel much more committed to the NDC system. 
Nevertheless, this choice on the part of the beneficiary would have to be subject to the 
financial sustainability of the system in the Samuelson sense. 
The process of transition from the current system to one of notional accounts should not pose 
any problems since the Spanish Social Security system has a reliable computerized register of 
each contributor's employment history. Thus, in order to respect the acquired rights of those 
who are close to retirement age, it could be established that the changeover to the new system 
should be carried out in such a way that pensions be calculated taking both systems into   22
account using coefficients that would depend on date of birth, in a similar way to how it is 
done in Sweden. 
The notional accounts model suggested for Spain should incorporate additional control 
elements for the solvency of the system as a whole. These could include, for example, a 
maximum annual level of deficit as a percentage of the GDP or a maximum accumulated level 
of deficit over five years, also as a percentage of the GDP. And so that contributors and initial 
pensions do not bear the brunt of the adjustment effort, pensions already in payment could be 
reviewed periodically to take into account any possible changes in mortality rates. Any of the 
formulas put forward in this section would be acceptable and could be chosen by the 
contributor as long as applying them brought about an annual or accumulated deficit below 
the level eventually set by law. A stabilizing mechanism could also be incorporated similar to 
that established in Sweden, Settegren (2001). However, as we point out in our conclusions 
further on, more research would need to be done into this matter. 
Following Holzmann (2005), in order to achieve a better coordinated pension system in an 
integrated Europe, and making the most of the fact that Spain already has a non-contributory 
pillar, this should be transformed into a zero pillar of social or non-contributory pensions 
providing minimum income support for the vulnerable elderly. Eligibility for the non-
contributory pension will naturally be means-tested, but in a more demanding and rigorous 
way than is done at present in Spain. 
Similarly with the contributory pillar, a means-tested guaranteed minimum pension should 
also be maintained, with the complement to bring it up to minimum levels being financed 
through taxation. Accurately setting the relation between the amount of the minimum pension 
and the pension the zero pillar could provide would be of the utmost importance. The 
possibility of contributors having a free choice as to the age they retire could bring about an 
excessive number of early retirements which, in turn, could put pressure on the authorities to 
increase the amount of the guaranteed minimum pension. Palmer (2001) shows that there is 
empirical evidence that people tend to retire as soon as they are allowed to, and so it should 
not be made possible for early retirement to be decided freely. One of the main problems of 
the Spanish pension system is that the real average retirement age is around 62 years. This is 
due to permissive legislation which in many cases allows early retirement. The possibility of 
early retirement should be eliminated. At first the minimum retirement age should be 
maintained at 65 as long as enough has been accumulated in the notional account to give 
entitlement to the minimum pension, otherwise the person will have to continue working until 
age 70. 
Alonso & Herce (2003) - see Table 5 for their main forecasts - state that the contributory 
pension system will go into deficit from the year 2020, and therefore around then would be 
the best time for the notional accounts system to be fully in place.  
Despite being technically possible, the process of introducing the notional accounts system in 
Spain could not be immediate mainly because it would be unviable from the political point of 
view today. As mentioned above, neither the previous government nor the current one in 
power since the general elections of 14 March 2004 consider any but parametric reforms. 
Increasing the way the pension base is calculated to cover the whole of working life, which 
almost all political parties think is a good idea, has been under discussion for over two years 
and is still far from being agreed. In addition to this, the way notional accounts work is 
unknown to both politicians and the main opinion makers in Spain.   23
A less radical proposal, but one which could be politically possible, would be the one shown 
in Table 14, more in line with the transition process followed in Italy and Sweden than that in 
Latvia. The transition suggested would mean both systems functioning side by side over a 20-
year period, after which the notional accounts system would take over completely. This 
should be accompanied by a change in the way the amount of pension is calculated so as to 
increase the pension base to cover the whole of the individual's working life and eliminate the 
possibility of retiring before age 65. Combining both systems would imply an improvement 
on the forecasts made by Alonso & Herce (2003), deferring the expected deficit and 
increasing the system's solvency for a time horizon of 20 years. 
Table 14: Timetable for adapting to pension reform in Spain.  
Year of 
retirement 
Pension received from the notional 
accounts system % 
Pension received from the current 
system
18 % 
2005  0 100 
2006  5 95 
.......  ....... ......... 
2023  90 10 
2024  95 5 
2025  100 0 
Source: own 
Various modifications could be made to the basic proposal above depending on the degree of 
political acceptance, which in Spain would be a rather thorny issue: 
1.-Extend the transition period to 40 years, for example, in which case the change in the 
amounts of pension would be much more gradual. As a consequence, however, the benefits of 
the change would be seen only gradually too. 
2.-Calculate the retirement pension following notional philosophy, but take into account 
acquired rights when calculating the initial notional capital.  
VI.-CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH.  
In the light of all the arguments looked at in the previous sections along with the research 
papers referred to, it seems clear that the main conclusion is that there is a need to carry out 
some kind of far-reaching reform of the contributory pension system in Spain.  
The discussion should therefore revolve around the type of reform to be applied rather than 
whether its introduction should be recommended. 
A reform option in the shape of a notional accounts system applying to all the various systems 
of the Spanish contributory system as a whole (including the Special System for Civil 
Servants) could enable the six objectives mentioned in section IV to be achieved. This reform 
would mean a reduction in the amount of pensions and IRR, but it would have the effect of 
giving the system greater credibility and greater long-term financial equilibrium, thereby 
avoiding constant piecemeal reforms. The objective of generating financial savings managed 
by the private sector could be achieved by strengthening the complementary systems and/or 
rerouting part of the contributions towards a funded system which would enable sources of 
retirement revenue and the risks inherent in the pension system in general to be diversified. 
                                                 
18 The number of years taken into account to calculate the pension base would start increasing by one year from 
2005.      24
Given that the risk is transferred explicitly to the contributor-beneficiary, great care would 
have to be taken over the design of the actual formula for calculating retirement pension. As 
was seen in the previous section, if contributor-beneficiaries who are neutral to risk are to be 
rewarded, contributions should be capitalized in line with the evolution of the GDP or the 
AEI. Pensions could participate in the upward fluctuations above the rate forecast of the index 
of variation in salaries. On the other hand, if the design of the formula were to reward 
contributor-beneficiaries who are more averse to risk, then the formula would be similar as 
regards contributions, but pensions would simply be adjusted in line with the RPI. 
In response to one of the criticisms that are usually made against notional account systems - 
that contributors take on the risk of the evolution of the index and are subject to a risk-return 
trade-off they have not chosen, i.e. their aversion to risk is not taken into account like it is in 
private capitalization funds - it would be best if there were a menu of retirement formulas 
available, such as those put forward in the previous section, and that contributors could 
change the index used to capitalize their contributions every so often (every three or five 
years, for example) according to their perception of risk and the evolution and anticipated 
pathway of the indices.  Involving the individual in taking decisions as to the model he 
considers most suitable will make him feel much more committed to the NDC system. This 
does not mean that there are no mechanisms to safeguard the financial equilibrium of the 
system in case of economic and/or demographic shocks. In practice, as mentioned above, 
some countries have mechanisms to stabilize the system in case serious financial imbalances 
appear. 
Finally, bearing in mind that this is the first proposal for introducing a notional accounts 
system in Spain and given the special features of the current pension system and the country's 
idiosyncrasies, at least three aspects need to be researched more deeply and carefully: 
1)  In order to evaluate more precisely the impact that introducing a notional accounts 
system could have on current contributors, there would be a need for a sufficiently 
wide representative sample of their real wage histories (and contribution bases). An 
analysis of this information could also be very useful for deciding how to carry out the 
definitive proposal for harmonizing the different occupational schemes. 
2)  The proposed measures for financial stability in case of short-term financial 
imbalances should be more precisely defined. 
3)  Spanish public opinion, social agents, politicians, and even economists and actuaries 
are unaware of how notional accounts work. So as to test the political viability of the 
reform, an opinion poll would need to be carried out to find out how acceptable the 
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